The von Neumann and Morgenstern (vNM) representation theorem. Broader significance of Expected Utility ( EU) theory. These theorems show that if preferences among acts meet certain constraints, such as transitivity, then there exist a probability function and a utility function (given a choice of scale) that generate . First, they are taken to characterize degrees of belief and utilities.
Secon they are taken to justify two fundamental rules of rationality: that we should have probabilistic degrees of belief and that we should act as expected utility . University of Massachusetts, Amherst.
Forthcoming in the Australasian Journal of Philosophy. Abstract: Contemporary decision theory places crucial emphasis on a family of mathematical called representation theorems , which relate criteria for evaluating the available options (such as the expected utility criterion) to axioms pertaining to the decision maker’s preferences (for example, the transitivity axiom ). Representation Theorems. Its main result is a proof of a representation theorem for preferences defined on sets of.
Why then do decision theorists so often assume completeness? One reason is that it makes the business of proving representation theorems for decision prin) ciples a lot easier mathematically speaking. A second reason lies in the influence of the Revealed Preference interpretation of decision theory.
Naive versions of decision theory take probabilities and utilities as primitive and use expected value to give norms on rational decision.
However, standard decision theory takes rational preference as primitive and uses it to construct probability and utility. This paper shows how to justify a version of the naive theory . The second question is easy. More generally, what properties does the binary relation УU have? Credences, utilities, and the representation thereof.
Two kinds of preference. The representational theory of measurement. Decision -theoretic representation theorems.
Practice makes perfect, and other lies we believe about learning – Duration: 9:24. Probabilists who prefer a more pragmatic, explicitly decision. PRELIMINARY DEFINITIONS 36. PART II APPLICATION TO DECISION THEORY.
REPRESENTATION THEOREMS. CRITIQUE OF EXPECTED UTILITY THEORY. SYSTEMATIC VIOLATION OF THE STRONG INDEPENDENCE.